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quippeThe Blurb On The Back:
The definitive new history of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the author of Chernobyl, winner of the Baillie Gifford Prize.
For more than four weeks in the fall of October 1962 the world teetered. The consequences of a misplaced step during the Cuban Missile Crisis could not have been more grave. Ash and cinder, famine and fallout; nuclear war between the two most-powerful nations on Earth.
In Nuclear Folly, award-winning historian Serhii Plokhy tells the riveting story of those weeks, tracing the tortuous decision-making and calculated brinkmanship of John F. Kennedy, Nikita Kruschchev and Fidel Castro, and of their advisors and commanders on the ground. More often than not, Plokhy argues, the Americans and Soviets simply misread each other, operating under mutual distrust, second-guesses and false information. Despite all of this, nuclear disaster was avoided thanks to one very human reason: fear.
Drawing on an impressive array of primary sources, including the recently declassified KGB files, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama of those tense days. Authoritative, fast-paced and unforgettable, this is the definitive new account of the Cold War’s most perilous moment.
Serhii Plokhy is Professor of History at Harvard University and a leading authority on Eastern Europe. Published in 2021, this gripping book draws on then recently released KGB files to analyse the Cuban Missile Crisis from both the US and Russian perspective, drawing out how badly Kruschev and Kennedy misread and misunderstood each others positions and how nuclear war was averted by fear and accident more than negotiation and decision.
I picked this up because I very much enjoyed Plokhy’s previous work (LOST KINGDOM: A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM FROM IVAN THE GREAT TO VLADIMIR PUTIN, FORGOTTEN BASTARDS OF THE EASTERN FRONT and CHERNOBYL: HISTORY OF A TRAGEDY) but my only knowledge of the Cuban Missile Crisis comes from the film THIRTEEN DAYS so I was keen to learn more about it.
Plokhy brings his trademark detailed research to this book. There are a lot of footnotes in the back citing sources and where the book is particularly strong is in using what were - at the time of publication - recently released KGB files to flesh out what was happening on the Russian side. As a Russian and Eastern Europe expert, Plokhy brings a lot of insight here, building out Krushchev’s bombastic character and capacity to over-reach but also showing how the upper levels of the Russian government worked at this time, in particular the way rivals used their silence and support to shore up their own position over the national interest.
Equally interesting is his analysis of the US side, highlighting the back channel that Kennedy’s brother, Bobby, was running with Russia and the differences between Kennedy’s public pronouncements and the discussions taking place behind the scenes. What I found particularly interesting was how at odds the military and CIA were with Kennedy and his political advisors and how the Secretary of Defense McNamara trod the line between the two. As with Krushchev, Plokhy conveys Kennedy’s character here, showing him as a man who is out of his depth when it comes to dealing with Russia and also indecisive as he struggles with a nightmare scenario, keen not to be seen as weak but also very aware of what the stakes are.
For the most part Plokhy does a good job of managing the time frame for the crisis and switching between the two sides to show what was happening and how they were reacting and trying to anticipate each other. There is some overlap between the two, which is inevitable in the circumstances, but it does not affect the momentum or the sense of tension that builds as the crisis grows.
Where I wanted more of the book was from the Cuban side. There is not much on Castro here and while that is - to an extent - true of the crisis with the Cubans being a forum more than a player, it would have been interesting to have had some idea of how they viewed the crisis and the Russians within their borders. This is especially the case when it came to the shooting down of a US plane, where the Cuban response is really only seen through reports from the Russian side. I should say that I do understand why there is not much from Cuban records here, but it is an omission and one that I really hope changes someday to give a fuller account.
That said, I came away from this book feeling much more familiar with the Crisis, the key players in the same and how events unfolded as they did. What I find particularly frightening is that back in 1962 politicians pulled back because they were terrified of the implications of a nuclear war for human kind and there were avenues that allowed them to avoid it, even though Russia ultimately lost face and it ultimately paved the way for Krushchev’s downfall. Looking at the state of 2025, I do wonder if such a crisis would play out in the same way or whether the so-called “strong men” would feel compelled to follow through on their threats and doom us all.
The Verdict:
Serhii Plokhy is Professor of History at Harvard University and a leading authority on Eastern Europe. Published in 2021, this gripping book draws on then recently released KGB files to analyse the Cuban Missile Crisis from both the US and Russian perspective, drawing out how badly Kruschev and Kennedy misread and misunderstood each others positions and how nuclear war was averted by fear and accident more than negotiation and decision.
Thanks to the Amazon Vine Programme for the review copy of this book.
For more than four weeks in the fall of October 1962 the world teetered. The consequences of a misplaced step during the Cuban Missile Crisis could not have been more grave. Ash and cinder, famine and fallout; nuclear war between the two most-powerful nations on Earth.
In Nuclear Folly, award-winning historian Serhii Plokhy tells the riveting story of those weeks, tracing the tortuous decision-making and calculated brinkmanship of John F. Kennedy, Nikita Kruschchev and Fidel Castro, and of their advisors and commanders on the ground. More often than not, Plokhy argues, the Americans and Soviets simply misread each other, operating under mutual distrust, second-guesses and false information. Despite all of this, nuclear disaster was avoided thanks to one very human reason: fear.
Drawing on an impressive array of primary sources, including the recently declassified KGB files, Plokhy masterfully illustrates the drama of those tense days. Authoritative, fast-paced and unforgettable, this is the definitive new account of the Cold War’s most perilous moment.
Serhii Plokhy is Professor of History at Harvard University and a leading authority on Eastern Europe. Published in 2021, this gripping book draws on then recently released KGB files to analyse the Cuban Missile Crisis from both the US and Russian perspective, drawing out how badly Kruschev and Kennedy misread and misunderstood each others positions and how nuclear war was averted by fear and accident more than negotiation and decision.
I picked this up because I very much enjoyed Plokhy’s previous work (LOST KINGDOM: A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM FROM IVAN THE GREAT TO VLADIMIR PUTIN, FORGOTTEN BASTARDS OF THE EASTERN FRONT and CHERNOBYL: HISTORY OF A TRAGEDY) but my only knowledge of the Cuban Missile Crisis comes from the film THIRTEEN DAYS so I was keen to learn more about it.
Plokhy brings his trademark detailed research to this book. There are a lot of footnotes in the back citing sources and where the book is particularly strong is in using what were - at the time of publication - recently released KGB files to flesh out what was happening on the Russian side. As a Russian and Eastern Europe expert, Plokhy brings a lot of insight here, building out Krushchev’s bombastic character and capacity to over-reach but also showing how the upper levels of the Russian government worked at this time, in particular the way rivals used their silence and support to shore up their own position over the national interest.
Equally interesting is his analysis of the US side, highlighting the back channel that Kennedy’s brother, Bobby, was running with Russia and the differences between Kennedy’s public pronouncements and the discussions taking place behind the scenes. What I found particularly interesting was how at odds the military and CIA were with Kennedy and his political advisors and how the Secretary of Defense McNamara trod the line between the two. As with Krushchev, Plokhy conveys Kennedy’s character here, showing him as a man who is out of his depth when it comes to dealing with Russia and also indecisive as he struggles with a nightmare scenario, keen not to be seen as weak but also very aware of what the stakes are.
For the most part Plokhy does a good job of managing the time frame for the crisis and switching between the two sides to show what was happening and how they were reacting and trying to anticipate each other. There is some overlap between the two, which is inevitable in the circumstances, but it does not affect the momentum or the sense of tension that builds as the crisis grows.
Where I wanted more of the book was from the Cuban side. There is not much on Castro here and while that is - to an extent - true of the crisis with the Cubans being a forum more than a player, it would have been interesting to have had some idea of how they viewed the crisis and the Russians within their borders. This is especially the case when it came to the shooting down of a US plane, where the Cuban response is really only seen through reports from the Russian side. I should say that I do understand why there is not much from Cuban records here, but it is an omission and one that I really hope changes someday to give a fuller account.
That said, I came away from this book feeling much more familiar with the Crisis, the key players in the same and how events unfolded as they did. What I find particularly frightening is that back in 1962 politicians pulled back because they were terrified of the implications of a nuclear war for human kind and there were avenues that allowed them to avoid it, even though Russia ultimately lost face and it ultimately paved the way for Krushchev’s downfall. Looking at the state of 2025, I do wonder if such a crisis would play out in the same way or whether the so-called “strong men” would feel compelled to follow through on their threats and doom us all.
The Verdict:
Serhii Plokhy is Professor of History at Harvard University and a leading authority on Eastern Europe. Published in 2021, this gripping book draws on then recently released KGB files to analyse the Cuban Missile Crisis from both the US and Russian perspective, drawing out how badly Kruschev and Kennedy misread and misunderstood each others positions and how nuclear war was averted by fear and accident more than negotiation and decision.
Thanks to the Amazon Vine Programme for the review copy of this book.
